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ABSTRACT
Through wireless localization, the position of a device (user) can be computed in a
world coordinate system using wireless signals.

Wireless localization systems for

estimating device/user location typically involve fusing measurement data obtained from
multiple access points (APs) by compute end-point, such as a cloud/edge-node. Such
systems, however, are prone to attacks that can be launched against a compute end-point.
To address such issues, techniques herein involve running wireless localization algorithms
on a new paradigm of computing involving secure enclave technology through which
localization algorithms can be protected from tampering. As a result, applications that may
be vulnerable to location manipulation can be more trusted to take action based on their
own interpretations of sensor data.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
In wireless localization, the position of a device or user can be computed in a world
coordinate system using wireless signals (i.e., to determine where the device/user is located
in a given indoor/outdoor 2D/3D space). This location is typically estimated by fusing data
from multiple (e.g., 3 or more) wireless access points (APs) that can independently measure
a wireless channel in terms of RSSI (received signal strength indicator) or CSI (channel
state information). These measured channel estimates are then sent from each individual
AP to a cloud/edge-node, where the measurements are fused to arrive at a single location
estimate for the device/user of interest. Without loss of generality, the compute end-point
where the location is computed is referred to herein as the "cloud".
This prevailing system for performing wireless localization is prone to an attack
model that typically involves attacks launched against the compute end-point that can gain
access to the code (the localization algorithm) or data (channel measurements and the final
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location estimate) in memory and, in some instances, even modify the algorithm/channel
measurements/location estimates. Such attackers can be in the form of a malicious cloud
provider, a competitor, or just a hacker (e.g., a malicious party with administrative
privileges). A few example consequences of such attacks may include:
a. Serious privacy concerns, for example, an attacker can determine that that
a particular user, say, Alice, spends time every week in the chips and sugar
aisle of the grocery store. Such data can be sold to an insurance provider.
b. Incorrect location estimates (the attacker modifies the computed location),
for example, even centimeters of location error makes a difference for many
applications. (e.g., Alice was incorrectly estimated to be in an unauthorized
part of the hospital because the Alice's location coordinates were
maliciously modified, a result is that Alice was locked out from providing
critical care).
c. Competitive (dis)advantage (e.g., a competitor who has access to
proprietary localization code).
Such potential consequences/issues can result in the following "confidential
computing" requirements:
1. Trusted Execution Environment: A system that prevents other applications
(including operating system (OS), virtual machine (VM), and/or
containerized applications) to access or modify the localization code and
data. This includes protections from root-enabled hackers.
2. Mutual Attestation: A system that can attest that no piece of the localization
algorithm pipeline has been compromised and that each piece is running
known, good software on trusted hardware. When a compromise is detected,
the APs detect it and no longer stream wireless channel measurements. As
an extension, if the cloud end-point detects a compromised AP, it should no
longer accept measurements from it.
3. Sealing: A system with a secure means to store the computed location data
such that no other application (besides the localization application that
created the location data), can read/modify the computed location data.
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Current localization algorithms often run on general purpose computing platforms.
Such platforms have a "large" attack surface, as shown in Figure 1, below, which results
in the attack model noted above.
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Figure 1: Exemplary General Purpose Computing Platform Attack Surface
To overcome such attacks, techniques of this proposal provide for executing
wireless localization algorithms on a new paradigm of computing, referred to as
'confidential computing', that can be utilized to facilitate secure enclave technology through
which localization algorithms can be protected from tampering.
In confidential computing, an application (e.g., localization algorithms, in this
proposal) runs inside a trusted execution environment in the hardware called an enclave.
When the localization algorithm runs within such an enclave, no other application
(including OS/VM/container) can access or modify the memory (code and data) of the
localization application.
These guarantees can be provided by the hardware itself (e.g., Intel® Software
Guard Extension (SGX)). The contents of the enclave (localization algorithm and data) can
be encrypted in memory such that any attempt to dump the memory or snoop the system
bus will only yield encrypted code and data. Furthermore, encryption keys (which can be
changed every power cycle) can be stored inside the central processing unit (CPU) itself
and, hence, become inaccessible. As a result, the enclave memory pertaining to a
localization algorithm and data cannot be read or written from outside the enclave itself
despite the privilege level or the CPU mode.
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Figure 2, below, is a schematic diagram illustrating example details through which
the CPU package forms the security boundary, such that snooping on the system bus or
dumping memory yields only encrypted location content.
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Figure 2: CPU Package Security Boundary
In wireless localization, the final computed 2D/3D location associated with the
user/device under consideration (e.g., Alice : <timestamp_1, x1,y1>) is written into
untrusted memory or storage. Later, such data can be queried both by 'history services',
and/or to provide a 'path track' (i.e., a continuum of <x,y> coordinates over time). Any
compromise on this individual location has privacy concerns as it directly maps the user to
their physical location over time.
Even though the location contents can potentially be handled in an encrypted
manner, a compromised OS or malware that obtains administrative privileges can have
unrestricted access to all resources and all applications running on the system. Such a
malicious entity can target an application's protection schemes to extract encryption keys.
To overcome this problem, this proposal leverages the "sealing/unsealing"
capability of the confidential computing paradigm. Accordingly, data can be written out of
and read back in by the enclave at a later date, all using encryption keys derived internally
by the hardware on demand. Depending on the localization use-case, two styles of
encryption keys can be employed:
4
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/4674

6689
5

Kalyanaraman and Voit: SECURE WIRELESS LOCALIZATION USING TRUSTED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS

1. Keys tied to the enclave alone—i.e. no other enclave can unseal the data as
the key is derived from the properties of the enclave (e.g., when forming a
track path using Kalman filter). In an Intel® SGX embodiment, such a key
would be uniquely identified by 'MRENCLAVE'.
2. Keys tied to a set of enclaves that are cryptographically signed by the same
author—i.e. only enclaves having the same signature authority can unseal
the data. For example, a history service enclave can unseal the data written
by the location compute service enclave which computes instantaneous
<x,y> coordinates based on wireless channel measurements, so long as the
two enclaves have a common signature authority. This is referred to as the
'MRSIGNER' in Intel® SGX.
Finally, there exist scenarios in wireless localization in which enclaves need to
"justify" (a.k.a. attest) to one another or to a third-party that they are who they claim to be
(i.e., running known good software) and are running on trusted hardware. Examples of
such attestations may include: (i) when a vendor has to attest to its customers that a
localization engine has not been compromised and it is running on trusted hardware, or (ii)
where one enclave has to communicate (data) with another enclave—e.g. the compute
enclave that calculates <x,y> communicates this result to a "Visualization Service" enclave.
During this exchange, each enclave seeks to ensure that the other party is who they
claim to be (running known good software) and is running on trusted hardware. For such
validation of a peer enclave, this proposal leverages the remote attestation capability of the
confidential computing paradigm. Figure 3, below, illustrates an example of the remote
attestation process involving Intel® SGX hardware.
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Figure 3: Example Remote Attestation Process
As illustrated in Figure 3, the "challenger" enclave on the right-side of the figure
"challenges" (asks) the peer enclave to demonstrate its correctness. The peer enclave
hardware generates a "quote" that represents the enclave and platform state, and signs the
quote with an Intel® Key. The challenger verifies the signature for authenticity and
compares the contents of the quote with its expected response for the peer enclave. If
successful, the challenger renders its service to the peer. Thus, two parts of the localization
algorithm pipeline can now exchange data between one another after mutually attesting
one another. Such operations can also enable a vendor to attest to customers that the
localization service has not been compromised (modified).
Accordingly, techniques proposed herein provide an advancement to the current
state-of-the art; however, several key add-on extensions may also be integrated into the
solution proposed herein. For example, it is possible that a hacker might try to adjust the
actual measurements which are being taken by sensors (i.e., the raw physical layer sensor
data used to calculate any of the vectors used for calculation could be compromised). In
this case, it is possible that the hardware used for the physical layer measurements (e.g.,
the physical layer chips) could be included in the secure enclave technology such that each
chip, even within a system, must register, seal, and/or encrypt communications being made
to a host localization service.
In another example, consider that the localization service can use inputs from
trusted devices that may be within sensing range of the targeted object. As in the first
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example, secure enclave technology which proved the trustworthiness and freshness of the
measurements could be used as input to the localization service. In yet another example
sensor types for different physical layer measurement types can be combined together. This
would allow location to be built from a heterogeneous and varying mix of sensed inputs
(e.g., e.g. Wi-Fi radios, visible light cameras, accelerometers, GPS signals, etc.). In yet
another example, a history of location could be used to determine when an incongruous
result from the calculation results may be an anomaly (e.g., for an instance in which results
indicate that a device with an accelerator has moved, but there wasn't any accelerometer
change).
In summary, techniques may provide for the ability to extend secure enclave
technology to wireless localization systems in order to ensure the integrity of localization
data, potentially at multiple hierarchical levels of localization systems that may
utilize/calculate localization data.
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